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Abstract
We show in a dynamic investment setting whether ￿rms choose FDI
or international portfolio investment (FPI) in the presence of stochastic
productivity taking into account di⁄erences in ￿ exibility of both invest-
ments. Isolated FPI and FDI investments are compared to combined FPI
and FDI investments. FDI requires higher investment speci￿c costs than
FPI. Thus, it is not possible to adjust FDI to environmental changes every
period. In contrast, FPI bears lower ￿xed costs and can be adjusted im-
mediately to short-term changes in the environment. Additionally, as a
result of the investors￿control position FDI yields a higher return than
FPI. Hence, there is a trade-o⁄ between ￿ exibility and higher return for
￿rms deciding between FDI and FPI. We explore whether as a consequence
of higher investment speci￿c ￿xed costs and lower ￿ exibility in the case
of FDI, small ￿rms prefer FPI and larger ￿rms invest in FDI. We show
that a combined strategy dominates the isolated strategy always in times.
Further, combined international investment comprises a higher incentive
for ￿rms to invest in r&d-investment and consequently ￿rm productivity
increase faster than with isolated international investment. Depending on
the success-probability and the correlation between the various investment
possibilities, even small ￿rms (low productivity) invest in FDI.
JEL: F21; F23; G11
Keywords: FDI, Portfolio Investment, Risk Diversi￿cation, endogeneous
Productivity
1FDI and FPI - Strategic Complements?
Barbara Pfe⁄er1
1 Introduction
The recent World Investment Report 2006 highlights that Foreign Direct In-
vestment (FDI) ￿ ows and growing FDI stocks are now at an unparalleled level
with most going to industrial countries. At the same time ￿ ows of international
portfolio investments (FPI) exceeded FDI ￿ ows twice at the beginning of the
nineties while more recently FPI growth slowed down and both capital ￿ ows
converged (WTO 1996). What are the motives for ￿rms to invest in one or the
other and how are they to be explained?
Previous studies on FDI explained the motives for FDI with di⁄erential rates
of return, di⁄erences in interest rates and risk diversi￿cation (Dunning (1973)).
Following Andersen and Hainaut (1998) these determinants lost explanatory
power and recent theoretical and empirical studies document that FDI is un-
dertaken to exploit cost advantages (vertical FDI) or to serve di⁄erent markets
locally to avoid trade costs (horizontal FDI).2, 3 If FDI no longer serves risk
diversi￿cation does FPI ￿ll the gap and are these capital ￿ ows strategic com-
plements rather than substitutes?4
We analyse whether ￿rms choose FDI or FPI in the presence of stochastic
productivity taking into account di⁄erences in ￿ exibility of both investments.
As FDI requires higher investment speci￿c costs it is not possible to adjust FDI
to environmental changes every period.5 In contrast, FPI bears lower ￿xed costs
and can be adjusted immediately to short-term changes in the environment. In
particular the assumption is that FDI is less ￿ exible than FPI and this reduced
￿ exibility entails a higher rigidity of FDI. A further distinction between FDI
and FPI is the possibility to exert control. FDI encloses control rights for
the investor. Thus, the investor is manager and owner in one person. He has
easy access to all information and has the possibility to navigate the investment
according to his own interests. FPI on the other hand does not comprise control
rights. In this case, the investor and the manager are di⁄erent persons with
1University of Siegen, Department of Ecoonomics, H￿lderlinstra￿ e 3, 57068 Siegen, Tel:
+49 271 740 4044, pfe⁄er@vwl.wiwi.uni-siegen.de
2Grossman, Helpman, Szeidl (2005) discuss in which states ￿rms decide to outsource or
o⁄shore some of their production stages. Acemoglu, Aghion, Gri¢ th and Zilibotti show that
vertical integration is more common if the technology intensity di⁄ers signi￿cantly.
3See Helpman, Melitz, Yeaple (2003) for a detailed survey whether ￿rms decide to serve
a foreign market through export or FDI - horizontal FDI. Studies of complex FDI strategies
can be found for example in Helpman (2006) or Grossman, Helpmann, Szeidl (2003).
4In contrast to the consumer theory, the cross-price elasticity of demand is not the decisive
factor for the present distinction between complements and substitutes. In the present analy-
sis "strategic-complements" represents the conscious choice of the investor to combine both
investment instruments. The decision whether to combine both investments depends not only
on the price / costs of the investment but the risk correlation and ￿exibility of the respective
investment instrument.
5See Goldstein and Razin (2005) for a discussion of the di⁄erent costs for FDI and FPI.
2di⁄ering interests. Information asymmetries and agency problems can arise.
Consequently, the investment project is not necessarily completely managed in
line with investors￿interest. Following Goldstein and Razin (2004), as a result of
the investors￿control position FDI yields a higher return than FPI. Hence, there
is a trade-o⁄ between ￿ exibility and higher return for ￿rms deciding between
FDI and FPI. We explore whether as a consequence of higher investment speci￿c
￿xed costs and lower ￿ exibility in the case of FDI, small ￿rms prefer FPI and
larger ￿rms invest in FDI.
We show that the combined investment strategy (FDI and FPI at the same
time) always starts the international investment activity earlier in time than
the isolated strategy (FDI or FPI). Additionally, with combined international
investment, there is a higher incentive for ￿rms to invest in research and devel-
opment (R&D) and consequently ￿rm productivity increases faster than with
isolated international investment. Depending on the success-probability and the
correlation between the various investment possibilities, even small ￿rms (low
productivity) invest in FDI.
To model ￿rm behaviour we use a monopolistic competition framework with
uncertain ￿rm productivity in combination with a dynamic investment approach
over a ￿nite investment horizon. There are three countries, home and two
foreign countries. The ￿rms are located in the home country and decide to
invest via FDI or FPI in the foreign countries. Thereby, they face uncertainty
about their future productivity and returns on the respective investment. In
particular, ￿rm productivity is endogenous and follows a Poisson process. The
productivity of the di⁄erent investment opportunities are correlated with each
other. Di⁄erences in correlation between FDI and home production account for
di⁄erent forms of FDI.6
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we examine
the di⁄erent de￿nitions of FDI and FPI and explain the motivations for ￿rms to
invest in FDI or FPI on the existing literature. Section 2 presents a overview of
the recent literature. Section 3 outlines the theoretical framework and derives
the optimality conditions for the various investments strategies. Following this,
we present the numerical solution of the model and discuss the results in section
4. Finally, section 5 concludes.
6Aizenman and Marion (2004) as well as Markusen and Maskus (2001) show that horizontal
FDI is established in countries similar in size and endowments, while vertical FDI is the
preferred investment in countries with di⁄erent characteristics as the source country.
32 Why should ￿rms diversify their risk and why
should they combine FDI and FPI?
The ￿rst problem that arises is to distinguish between the two investment in-
struments FDI and FPI. FDI and FPI consist of di⁄erent kinds of foreign equity
interests like equity shares, securities or derivatives.7 Most of all, the explana-
tion of FDI and the accompanying activities are not unambiguous. There is the
macro view which counts FDI as a speci￿c capital ￿ ow between various coun-
tries. It measures FDI in Balance of Payments Statistics. On the other hand,
the micro view examines the motivations of foreign direct investment from the
investors￿point of view. This view concentrates especially on the consequences
resulting from investment for the investor, the host and the home country as
well as on the ￿rm activities. The main emphasize is that the motivation as
well as the consequences of FDI arise from the investors￿- the investing ￿rms￿-
control and in￿ uence on the management of the foreign investment or a¢ liate.
However, the de￿nition of FDI does not only change with the underlying theory
but also has changed in time and still changes with institution. A prominent
and widely accepted de￿nition is the IMF (1993) concept. It is stated rela-
tively vague that a direct investment is international investment that comprises
a long-term interest in the relationship between the investing and the foreign
￿rm. Furthermore, the investing ￿rm clearly possesses a signi￿cant in￿ uence on
the management or production process of the foreign ￿rm. In addition to this
rather loose concept, the IMF exempli￿es a speci￿c recommendation of 10%
share-ownership at which FDI and a corresponding degree of control is identi-
￿ed. The IMF FDI perception complies with the Balance of Payment Statistics
view of FDI. The micro view is more represented by the FDI de￿nition of the
United Nations System of National Accounts. In this concept, the main em-
phasis is placed on the investors￿control on the foreign ￿rm. The threshold for
control and a perceptible in￿ uence on the foreign ￿rm is at 10 - 50% or more of
shares owned by the investing ￿rm. The precise share depends on the individual
country de￿nition of foreign control.8 These are only two examples for the dif-
fering concepts and de￿nitions of FDI. Based on these diverging perceptions it is
di¢ cult to distinguish explicitly between FDI and FPI. Moreover, the ambigu-
ous de￿nitions do not really provide a clear cut between FDI and FPI: Lipsey
(1988) quotes an example where previous portfolios ￿ ows were converted into
direct investment ￿ ows. Hence, there is no unambiguous distinction of FDI and
FPI from the composition of the respective capital ￿ ow or by a de￿nite control
threshold. Consequently, in the present paper we will emphasize the various
characteristics like control and volatility of the two investment instruments to
distinguish between them. Furthermore, we will examine what the motivations
of a ￿rm are to invest in FDI or FPI and whether there are any gains from
7FPI in a broader sense also can include bonds, money market instruments, ￿nancial
options and debt securities.
8For a detailed discussion of this concept see Inter-Secretariat Working Group on National
Accounts (1993). For more various views on FDI and its de￿nition see Lipsey (1999, 2001).
4combining both investments.
The second question arising concerns mainly the motivations for a ￿rm to
invest in FPI. Whereas ￿rms￿motivations to invest in FDI are widely explored,
the reasons for FPI are rather unexplored or just ignored. An arising strand of
literature highlights the increasing interest and necessity in ￿rms￿risk hedging.
This constitutes a more than appropriate motivation for ￿rms engaging in FPI.
An accepted reason for multinational ￿rms to engage in risk sharing via ￿nancial
markets is exchange rate volatility. Mello et al. (1995) for example show that
the production choice and the competitive position of ￿rm depend strongly on
an appropriate ￿nancial risk hedging strategy with respect to exchange rate
risk. One of the ￿rst approaches to combine ￿nancial hedging and corporate
diversi￿cation is made by Ding and Kouvelis (2007). Still, they justify a ￿rms￿
hedging necessity solely on exchange rate risk and price uncertainties. Lim and
Wang (2007) show that operational risks arising inside the ￿rm like for example
the uncertainty of ￿rm-speci￿c investments by non-￿nancial stakeholders may
also require ￿rms to engage in risk diversi￿cation. Furthermore, they argue
that it is not only possible to combine ￿nancial and corporate diversi￿cation to
hedge external and internal risks more e¢ ciently. Actually, they ￿nd that the
combination of the two hedging instruments complement each other. Lim and
Wang argue that ￿nancial and corporate diversi￿cation hedges di⁄erent types
of risk. Movements of the market or industry as a whole can be hedged with
￿nancial instruments but not with corporate diversi￿cation. On the other hand,
it is not possible or extremely costly to reduce ￿rm-speci￿c risk via ￿nancial
markets. Corporate diversi￿cation is the appropriate instrument to hedge this
idiosyncratic risk. If a ￿rm engages in ￿nancial risk sharing and thus reduces
its systematic risk then the share of idiosyncratic risk increases. Consequently,
reducing ￿rm-speci￿c risk by corporate diversi￿cation becomes more valuable.
These considerations con￿rm our assumption that a combination of FPI and
FDI may enhance the value international direct investment for a ￿rm.
A third controversial is the question, why a ￿rm should engage in ￿nancial
hedging. The common view is that a ￿rm should emphasize its operational
activities and risk diversi￿cation should be managed by the respective share-
holder itself. However, the empirical evidence shows that ￿rms indeed engage
in risk diversi￿cation.9 There are several reasons why risk diversi￿cation by
a ￿rm cannot be substituted by shareholder portfolio diversi￿cation. First of
all, ￿nancing costs can be reduced and tax bene￿ts can be realized if ￿nancial
risk diversi￿cation is undertaken by the ￿rm instead of each individual share-
holder.10 A further advantage of ￿rms￿risk hedging activities is the reduction
of risk for not fully diversi￿ed managers and investors. Nevertheless, a crucial
point is the protection of ￿rm-speci￿c investment of non-￿nancial stakehold-
ers. These investments are a function of a ￿rms￿total risk and hence ￿nancial
9See for example Bodnar et al. (1998) or for more recent empirical evidence Gates (2006)
and Nocco and Stulz (2006).
10Stulz (1984) o⁄ers an extensive survey on the reasons for corporate risk management.
Froot et al. (1993) emphasize on the reduced ￿nancing costs and Graham and Smith (1999)
examine the tax bene￿ts of ￿rms risk hedging activities.
5risk diversi￿cation enhances ￿rm-speci￿c investments. Again, this supports our
assumption of additional gains for ￿rm by combining FDI and FPI.
Finally, we link the information based trade-o⁄ literature between FDI and
FPI by Goldstein and Razin (2005) (RG) and Albuquerque (2003) with the ￿rm-
level Export and FDI approaches by Grossman, Helpman and Szeidl (2006) and
Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2003). RG analyse the investors￿decision between
FDI and FPI under asymmetric information in a static model.11 As a result of
the information asymmetry the project revenue from FDI is higher than from
FPI. In the case of FDI the investor is also the manager of the foreign ￿rm.
Hence, he has a higher control over the production processes and can ensure that
the ￿rm is run accordingly to the investors￿interests. If the investor chooses
FPI the investor has no control over the foreign production process and the
expected return is lower. We use these di⁄erent characteristics shown by RG to
motivate the costs, ￿ exibility and return of the di⁄erent investment possibilities
in the present paper. Additionally, we consider the ￿ndings of Chuhan, Perez-
Quiraz and Popper (1996). They provide an empirical analysis on the di⁄erent
characteristics of short term and long term capital ￿ ows.12 Furthermore, in
contrast to RG, we introduce a long-term investor in a dynamic setting. This
investor has the possibility to adjust his portfolio periodically with rigidity in
FDI-shares. Hence, we also account for the di⁄erent grades of ￿ exibility of both
investments.
Alburquerque (2003) analyses from a country perspective the risk-sharing
character of FDI and non-FDI capital ￿ ows for countries with di⁄erent degrees
of ￿nancial constraints. Thereby, non-FDI ￿ ow adjustments arise from shocks
in the receiving country. One result is that for ￿nancially constrained countries
FDI is less volatile than non-FDI ￿ ows. With perfect enforcement, the di⁄erence
in volatility diminishes. We modify this approach by taking the ￿rm perspective
and consider shocks on ￿rm level as well as on host country level. Actually, we
always ￿nd a higher volatility of non-FDI ￿ ows (FPI) than FDI ￿ ows in our
￿rm-level perspective. The ￿rm reacts to any short-term environment change
by adjusting FPI. Precisely, FPI has the main function to smooth risk whereas
FDI mainly exploits gains from technology transfers.
Uncertain ￿rm productivity is decisive for the results of our model. This
leads to the literature around Melitz (2003) or Grossman, Helpman and Szeidl
(2006). They motivate the ￿rms￿choice to export or engage in FDI with dif-
fering ￿rm productivity. Melitz (2003) shows that with heterogeneous ￿rms
only the large ￿rms (with higher productivity) export. Small ￿rms serve the
domestic market only. Furthermore, Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2003) extend
this and ￿nd that ￿rms with higher productivity use higher integrated organi-
sational production structures. They show that less productive ￿rms only serve
the domestic market, with increasing productivity ￿rms start to export and ￿-
nally the most productive ￿rms engage in FDI. In contrast to this literature, in
the present paper ￿rm productivity is endogenous. Firms can push their pro-
11See also Razin, Mody and Sadka (2002) and Razin (2002).
12Lipsey (2001) also emphasize di⁄erences in volatility as a distinction between FDI and
FPI.
6ductivity by investing in research and development (R&D). The success of the
R&D-investment is uncertain. Moreover, we extend these models by introducing
FPI as a new form of investment possibility.
3 Theoretical Framework
The dynamic methodology in the model follows roughly the models of Abel
(1973) and Holt (2003).
Firms optimize their investment decisions in a continuous-time model.13 In-
spired by Melitz (2003), the model is based on monopolistic competition with
stochastic ￿rm productive. Domestic demand is exogenous and the consumers
have Dixit-Stiglitz preferences. There are three countries. Two of these coun-
tries are northern countries West (home country) and East (foreign). The third
country is a southern country (foreign). In the eastern country, as a result of the
factor endowments production and cost structure are similar to the home coun-
try. Additionally, these countries are also based on a close cultural background.
Hence, we assume a positive correlation of the productivities between the East
and the home county. On the opposite, the South has di⁄erent production,
cost structure and cultural background than the home and the eastern country.
Hence we assume negative productivity correlations between South and home
or South and East.
We consider a setting in which a representative ￿rm faces a choice between
performing activities at home (production and R&D-investment) and engaging
in two alternative foreign investments: foreign portfolio investment (FPI) or
foreign direct investment (FDI). The initial position of each ￿rm is home pro-
duction and home R&D investment. Based on these home activities the ￿rm
can additionally choose to invest internationally. The ￿rm￿ s speci￿c productiv-
ity ￿ is the crucial factor for the international investment decision of the ￿rm.
In particular, the ￿rm can increase its speci￿c productivity by investing in do-
mestic research and development (R&D). Whether R&D-investment increases









In (1) ￿t is the capital invested in R&D and Kt is the total stock of capital
available to the ￿rm in period t.14 As obsolete technologies have to be replaced,
patent laws are renewed etc., even in case of successful R&D-investment, the
growing rate of ￿ is smaller than the invested rate of capital. These costs
correspond to a constant depreciation and are depicted by ￿ 2 [0;1]. Finally q
is a random variable that equals 1 with probability ￿ and 0 otherwise. Hence,







(1 ￿ ￿) R&D-investment fails and ￿ stays unchanged.
13Time runs from 0 to T.
14t 2 [0;T].
7As every ￿rm, no matter whether it engages in FDI, FPI or not, produces
at home and serves the home market, we start with the analysis of the home
country.
3.1 Home
Production The ￿rm uses a single factor, capital, to produce output at home
xh
xh






The superscript h states that these are the values in the isolated "Home"-
scenario.15 According to (1), ￿rms also can use capital to invest in R&D and
increase their productivity
Kt = kh
t + ￿t. (3)






Where the rent for capital is set equal to one, 1
’ is the pro￿t maximizing mark
up and 1
￿t are the marginal costs of a ￿rm with productivity ￿t. Furthermore,
the ￿rm has ￿xed costs of home production equal to fh
t and costs of R&D-
investment equal to ￿t. Hence, the pro￿t of the ￿rm at home in period t is














, 0 < ￿ < 1. (5)
The ￿rst term on the right hand side equals the revenue from production and
sales at the home market, rh
t . The second term on the right hand side summa-
rizes the costs of home production and R&D investment.
The expected value of ￿rm pro￿ts over the whole time horizon is







subject to (2) - (4). Modi￿cation of (6) yields:
￿V h (￿t)dt = max
kh
t ; ￿t




which states that the mean required return of a ￿rm equals the expected return.
In period t, the expected return consists of the maximized pro￿t at t and the
expected gain or loss of the future pro￿t ￿ ow.






V h (￿t￿t) ￿ V h (￿t)
￿
dt (8)
with ￿t ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿t
Kt.16 Equation (8) is the expected capital ￿ ow. The expected
15The following scenarios with isolated FPI, FDI and the combined investments are identi-
￿ed by the superscripts p, d, and c respectively.
16For a detailed derivation see Appendix A.
8capital ￿ ow is a perpetual ￿ ow of the di⁄erence between the capital ￿ ow in case
of successful R&D investment V h (￿t￿t) and without successful R&D investment
V h (￿t) weighted with the success-probability. Substituting (8) back into (7) and
divide by dt yields:




￿t (￿t) + ￿
￿
V h (￿t￿t) ￿ V h (￿t)
￿￿
. (9)
There are two important features about (9) which one should keep in mind
thorough the following analysis. Firstly, all important information about the
past concerning current or future decisions is summarized in ￿. How the ￿rm
reached the present productivity does not matter at all. Secondly, choosing the
optimal production and R&D-investment strategy with respect to the problem
starting at the current productivity level ￿ that results from the initial ￿rm
strategies, is the optimal strategy no matter what the initial strategy of the
￿rm was.
Optimality Conditions for R&D-Investment and Production Strate-
gies From (9) we can derive the optimality conditions for ￿rm-strategies for
R&D-investment and home production.
R&D Investment Deriving the marginal valuation of R&D-investment
from (9) yields17
￿￿ (￿) + ￿V h
￿ (￿￿) = 0. (10)
The second part of the brackets of (9) disappears, as V h (￿) does not depend on












The marginal valuation of R&D-investment is a perpetual ￿ ow equal to one mi-
nus the revenue changes caused by ￿, discounted by the probability of successful
R&D-investment. The return decreases in the additional R&D investment be-
cause available capital for the domestic production is reduced. Thus (11) is
positive. However, R&D investment increases the productivity and hence the
output produced with one unit capital. Consequently, the valuation of addi-
tional corresponds to the decreased return caused by the R&D investment.
17For simpli￿cation, the time indices are dropped.
18For mathematical details see Appendix.
9Home Production Di⁄erentiating the right hand side of (9) with respect
to kh, we obtain
￿kh (￿) + ￿
￿
V h
























The subscripts unequal to t stand for the partial derivation. For simplicity, in
the following cases the derivation subscripts are shortened to h for the deriva-
tion with respect to capital invested in home production instead of kh.19 The
marginal valuation of production-investment, in the case of successful R&D-
investment equals the marginal valuation of production-investment with no
R&D investment minus the marginal revenue stream resulting from increased
capital in production - discounted with the probability of successful R&D-
investment. It is V h
h (￿) minus the revenue stream, as the valuation of kh in
case of additional investment in R&D is examined. Capital is divided between
R&D investment and domestic production. If R&D investment is successful,
the valuation of domestic production decreases relatively to unsuccessful R&D
because there is an alternative use for capital with a high valuation. Analysing
just the valuation of kh without the increased productivity would be V h
h (￿￿)
plus the revenue stream.
An optimal strategy requires that the marginal valuation of investment in
production equals the marginal valuation of R&D-investment. We can derive














Similar to (11) the marginal valuation of investment in production equals a ￿ ow
consisting of one plus the di⁄erence between the revenue change caused by the
two investment decisions. Again, this ￿ ow is discounted by the probability of
successful R&D investment.20
Equation (13) re￿ ects the trade-o⁄between investing in R&D or not. First of
all, investing in R&D reduces the capital available to invest in domestic produc-
tion. This e⁄ect is negative. But secondly, R&D-investment increases produc-
tivity and higher productivity enforces the output of the employed production-
capital and decreases the variable production costs x
￿. Hence, there is also a
positive e⁄ect of R&D-investment on the marginal valuation of capital invested
in home-production. These considerations are re￿ ected in the second part of
(13).
19The subscripts will be analogue p for investment in FPI and d for investment in FDI
instead of kp and kd.
20Consequently, V (￿￿) = ￿ 1
￿
r￿
! . The intuition is that with increased ￿ the return de-
creases directly, r￿ < 0. The valuation of domestic production in total is positive as with
foregone R&D investment kh increases and thus increases the additional return.
103.2 Home and Foreign Portfolio Investment
Now, we analyse the investment decision of the ￿rm and allow for an additional
investment alternative, namely foreign portfolio investment (FPI). With FPI




t + ￿t. (14)
This shows that the total capital available to a ￿rm can be used to invest in
domestic production, R&D-investment (the same as in the scenario above) and
additionally kp is the capital invested in FPI. As the ￿rm invests in FPI, it gains
ownership on a foreign ￿rm. But the domestic ￿rm has no - or only in￿nitely
small - possibility to exert control over the foreign production and management
process. Thus the domestic ￿rm cannot directly in￿ uence the foreign revenue
and the gained dividend
r
p
t = ￿t (k
p
t). (15)





where dz is a Wiener process with mean zero and unit variance. Following (15)
and (16), the only impact the home ￿rm has on the foreign investment, is the
decision of how much capital to invest in FPI.
Investment in FPI requires buying assets, time to select the appropriate
assets, additional administration systems and e⁄orts etc. All these e⁄orts are
summarized as ￿xed costs f
p
t for this investment. Yet the pro￿t function for the
￿rm (5) changes to



















Following the steps in the home-scenario we get the multi-period optimization
problem for the ￿rm





￿t (￿t)dt + Et (dV p) (18)
subject to (2), (4) and (14) - (16). As the ￿rm is now in the FPI-scenario, the
superscript changed to p and there is one more control variable, namely k
p
t. The
expected future capital ￿ ow depends on two state variables ￿t and ￿t:22
dV p = V
p









Thus in case of FPI investment, the expectation of the change in the expected
capital ￿ ow consists of three parts

















22For simpli￿cation, the time indices are dropped.
11The ￿rst part is similar to the expected capital ￿ ow in the Home-scenario.
Additionally, the variations of the foreign return impacts V p. This impact occurs
in the second term. Finally, the third term accounts for common variations
of home productivity and foreign productivity that can result from global or
industry shocks. The direction of this correlation depends on ￿p ￿ (dq)(dz￿) 6=
0. If the ￿rm invests FPI in the East, ￿p is positive. ￿p is negative with FPI in
the southern country.
In case of FPI, the present value of the ￿rm pro￿t ￿ ows is





[￿p (￿) + ￿[V p (￿￿) ￿ V p (￿)] + "] (21)
with " ￿ "a + "b, "a ￿ 1
2￿2￿2
￿V p
￿￿ and "b ￿ V
p
￿￿ (￿￿)(￿￿￿)￿p. The uncertain
foreign productivity in￿ uences the present value of the pro￿t ￿ ows twice. Firstly,
the isolated variation of the foreign productivity "a enters the capital ￿ ows and
secondly, the common variation of home and foreign productivity "b changes the
capital ￿ ows. Whereas, the home productivity change is a discrete shock and
" is continuous. Similar to (9), all necessary information for any decision are
summarised in ￿ and ￿. Further, any optimality of future decision on FPI, home
production or R&D-investment is independent of the ￿rms￿initial decision.
Optimality Conditions with FPI





























@￿ . FPI does not have any direct impact
on the R&D-investment. In comparison to the pure Home-scenario, the marginal
valuation of R&D-investment is reduced by ￿. This e⁄ect arises through the
common variation of the home and foreign productivities. If the ￿rm invests
into closely related industries or even in the same industry (eastern country,
￿p > 0 ) then the own risk is not reduced. Thus ￿ is positive and reduces the
marginal valuation of R&D-investment slightly but never completely compen-
sates it. Contrary, with investment in a dissimilar industry (South, ￿p < 0) the
risk of R&D failure is diversi￿ed. ￿ is negative and increases the valuation of
R&D-investment.














Following the optimality principle, we can equate the marginal valuation of
















Similar to (22), the valuation changes by ￿. Analogue to (22), the change
depends on the industry invested in.
FPI Optimality requires that the marginal valuation of FPI also equals
the marginal valuation of investment in home production and R&D-investment.
Therefore we di⁄erentiate (21) with respect to kprearranging delivers
V p









Valuation of FPI is lower with investment located in the East (similar produc-
tion and cost structure, "p > 0) than with investment located in the South
(di⁄erent factor endowment, production and cost structure "p < 0). Obviously,
the diversi￿cation of the risk increases the valuation of the investment abroad.
FPI vs Home The results from deriving all optimality conditions for FDI are
summarized in Table (1):
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Table 1: Optimality Conditions with FPI
Table (1) shows that the e⁄ect of FPI on the marginal valuation of investment
in home production and R&D is twofold. Additional capital invested abroad
reduces capital available for domestic production and R&D-investments. A
further e⁄ect arises through the exploitation of risk diversi￿cation possibilities,
￿. Investment into countries with closely related industries (East) diminishes
the valuation of domestic production, ￿ > 0. Similar sources of risks are added.
Investments in dissimilar countries (South) push the valuation slightly up, ￿ <
0. In this case, FPI constitutes a hedging instrument for the existing R&D-risk.
Finally, the additional variation of a further unit capital invested in FPI,
"p, impacts the valuation of home production. At the same time, "p a⁄ects
the valuation of FPI in the opposite direction. The marginal valuation of home
production increases with further FPI in the East, "p > 0 and decreases with ad-
ditional southern FPI. Eastern FPI delivers additional variation and risk. Home
production is valued higher as it is a more secure source of future capital ￿ ows.23
23FPI valuation decreases through the same e⁄ect.
13FPI in the South hedges existing home risk and consequently the valuation of
home production decreases, "p < 0.24 Additional southern FPI dampens the
R&D risk and enforces further R&D investments. The ￿rm withdraws capital
from home production and invests the available capacities into southern FPI.
Hence, with isolated investment possibilities the ￿rm will engage in southern
FPI.
3.3 Home and Foreign Direct Investment
In the case of FDI, the home ￿rm takes ownership as well as control over the
foreign ￿rm and thus can in￿ uence the pro￿t of its direct-investment. In the
present paper, the ￿rm only transfers capital to the foreign ￿rm. No interme-
diate goods are traded. However, the choice of the FDI receiving country has a
signi￿cant impact on the valuation of FDI.
If the home ￿rm decides for FDI it also transfers intangible assets, as for
example managerial skills, technology..., to the foreign ￿rm. As a side e⁄ect of
this asset transfer, a part of the home productivity directly enters the return of
FDI
rd










; 0 < a < 1. (26)
Home productivity ￿ does not impact the foreign investment to the same extent,
than home production. This can be caused by country speci￿c conditions or
incomplete mobility of some home skills.25   is the foreign productivity which
is stochastic and varies with26
d  =  ￿ dz . (27)
Again, dz  is a Wiener process with mean zero and unit variance. The amount
of capital invested in FDI is kd. Hence equation (3) becomes
Kt = kh
t + kd
t + ￿t. (28)
Further, FDI requires some speci￿c up-front costs like country and market re-
search, a merger or building a new plant. All these activities are costly and
summarized in fd, as the ￿xed costs arising from FDI. Now the modi￿ed pro￿t
function of the home ￿rm is




















It is important to keep in mind, that the FDI ￿x costs, fd exceed the FPI ￿x
costs, fp.
The dynamic optimization problem of the home ￿rm is










24In this case, the valuation of FPI increases.
25With a ! 1, the FDI scenario would be the same than the FPI scenario.
26  2 R+
14Equation (30) is a function of the state variables home productivity ￿ as well
as foreign productivity  : The control variables are the three investment pur-
poses, kh;kd;￿. The derivation of the functional equation from (30) is analogue
to the steps in the FPI-scenario. Thus, we get

















  , ￿b ￿ V d
 ￿ ( ￿ )(￿￿)￿d and ￿d ￿ (dz )(dq).
Analogue to the FPI scenario, the uncertainty of the foreign productivity has
two impacts on the present value of the pro￿t ￿ ows: the variation of the for-
eign productivity ￿a and the common variation of the foreign and the home
productivity ￿b. All necessary information for any decision is included in ￿ and
 .
Optimality Conditions with FDI
R&D Investment Following the same steps as in the two previous














First, there is a additional impact of FDI on the marginal valuation of R&D-
investment. It is a very small positive e⁄ect through a slight increase in the
foreign revenue. In comparison to the isolated home-scenario, this marginal
change in rd again increases the marginal valuation of R&D-investment.





@￿ . The sign of { is not de￿nite. The degree (1
a) of the home productivity
in￿ uence on foreign revenue is decisive for {.
Proposition 1 If a > 1 (low control over foreign ￿rm - low impact of ￿ on
rd) then in both cases, eastern and southern FDI, { > 0 holds. If a < 1 and
additional R&D exceeds the revenue losses caused by reduced capital input in
FDI, then with FDI in the East { > 0 holds and { < 0 holds for southern
FDI.28, 29
27Again, the time indices are dropped for the simpli￿cation of the equations.
28If the additional R&D investment increases productivity less than it reduces the additional
return by reducing the available capital input for production, { changes its sign according to
the respective FDI location. However, in the case with low control (a > 1) the impact of {
on the R&D valuation stays unchanged.
29A di⁄erent assumption about the impact of foreign productivity   changes these e⁄ects.
If additional productivity shows decreasing additional e⁄ects,  ￿ with ￿ < 1 then even with
low impact of the domestic ￿rm on the foreign ￿rm, (a > 1) ,{ < 0 with eastern and southern
FDI. Thus FDI increases the valuation of domestic R&D. Based on the same assumption but
with high impact on the foreign ￿rm, (a < 1), in the case of eastern FDI x > 0 and { < 0 for
FDI in the South. In particular, R&D valuation increases with FDI in the South as technology
transfer is facilitated and FDI in the East does not yield additional returns for further R&D
investment.
15With low impact on the foreign ￿rm the valuation of domestic R&D-investment
deceases with FDI. It does not matter whether FDI would be located in the
East or in the South. If the domestic ￿rm has a high impact on the foreign ￿rm,
southern FDI enhances the R&D valuation. FDI in the East does not change its
impact on the R&D valuation. The technology transfer with horizontal FDI in
countries with di⁄ering production and cost structures is rather complicated and
depends strongly on the cost structure of the di⁄erent countries.30 Therefore,
the implementation of new technologies - developed for domestic production -
in the South is only possible with a strong control position or a high impact of
the domestic productivity on the foreign ￿rm. Only based on these conditions,
additional R&D investment induces additional valuation in the case of southern
FDI. FDI in the East does not increase the R&D valuation neither with a high
nor with low impact on the foreign ￿rm. In this case additional capital is rather
invested in FDI production directly than into domestic R&D-investment. As
Home and East are very similar countries, additional R&D investment accounts
for an investment similar to investment in FDI. This FDI implies additional
productivity by adding the foreign productivity to the already existing domes-
tic productivity. Such a productivity push caused by additional FDI increases
the valuation of FDI and decreases the R&D valuation.
Home Production As expected from the previous section, home pro-
duction stays unchanged again
V d


























The changes in ￿ a⁄ect directly the FDI revenue and indirectly the variations
of the productivity of FDI. The reduction of the marginal valuation of the
investment in home production is not as high as under FPI. In the current case,
R&D-investment does not only diminish the capital available for FDI, it also
increases the productivity of capital invested in the foreign ￿rm. Further, the
sign of { depends on the FDI location.
FDI To derive the optimality condition for FDI, we di⁄erentiate (31) with
respect to kd. This yields
V d









30Grossman, Helpman and Szeidl (2003) show that under di⁄erent cost structures in the
observed countries, ￿rm strategies changes from horizontal to vertical FDI and vice versa.
16Equation (35) shows that the marginal valuation of FDI in case of successful
R&D-investment depends again on the FDI location. If the ￿rm invests in
eastern FDI then the term in the brackets remains positive and hence reduces
the valuation. On the other hand, if the ￿rm undertakes southern FDI the sign
of ￿ changes. But the indirect e⁄ect through ￿ is weaker than the direct e⁄ect of
the changed revenue. Thus the valuation is still reduced but not as much as in
the case of FDI in the East. Generally, we ￿nd a decreasing marginal product of
capital either invested in domestic production or invested in foreign production.
However, a negative correlation between domestic and foreign productivity at
hand, the decrease of the marginal product invested in FDI is damped.
FDI vs Home Table (2) summarizes the optimality conditions with FDI:
R&D V d
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Table 2: Optimality Conditions with FDI
As discussed above, FDI impacts the marginal valuation of R&D-investment
(￿rst row of Table (2) up. This e⁄ect depends on the impact degree of the do-
mestic productivity on the foreign revenue. With low domestic impact on rd
FDI decreases the valuation of R&D in either location. High domestic impact
on rd changes the impact of southern FDI on R&D-valuation. The results
of domestic R&D-investment are easily transferred to the foreign ￿rm. R&D
does not only increase the domestic productivity but also boosts the foreign
return by increasing the transferred productivity. Further, these e⁄ects carry
over to the valuation of investment in home-production with respect to R&D-
investment. From the second row of Table (2), it is obvious how the valuation
of capital invested in home production depends on the di⁄erent e⁄ects of FDI.
Additional capital invested abroad decreases the marginal revenue of FDI no
matter whether the ￿rm undertakes southern or eastern FDI. This e⁄ect in-
creases the valuation of investment in domestic production. Similar to R&D,
FDI impacts the valuation of domestic production indirectly by the common
variation of foreign and home productivity {.
The last parameter in the home valuation stands for the variation of one
additional unit capital invested in FDI. Analogue to the FPI scenario, FDI in
the East adds additional variations. The valuation of home production increases
with further eastern FDI. In this case, home production is a very close substitute
for FDI and even a more secure source for future capital ￿ ows. FDI in the south
adds variations not common to the home variations. Thus, home production is
not a close substitute for southern FDI as additional - even though only minor
- gains on risk diversi￿cation arise with southern FDI.
17The marginal valuation of FDI with respect to R&D (row three, Table (2))
equals a perpetual ￿ ow of the di⁄erence of changed revenues through additional
capital invested in FDI and R&D, discounted by the probability of successful
R&D-investment. The hedging components impact the FDI valuation in the
same way as the R&D-valuation.
Finally, with isolated FDI the preferred location depends on the impact
degree of home productivity on foreign revenue - or rather on the control degree
of the investor. High control investors prefer southern FDI and low control
investors are indi⁄erent between eastern or southern FDI.
3.4 Home and Combined International Investment
Finally, we analyse a combined international investment strategy for the ￿rm.
Besides the usual home activities of the ￿rm, it invests in FPI as well as in FDI
at the same time. Because there are four di⁄erent investment alternatives for





t + ￿t. (36)
The return functions of the international investments are similar to the re-
turn functions under isolated international investment. Hence, the ￿rms￿pro￿t
function with combined international investment is31
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and the dynamic ￿rm problem is:32
￿V c (￿)dt = max
kh;kp;kd;￿
[￿c (￿)dt + Et (dV c)]. (38)
The control variables in the dynamic combined optimization problem are the
various investment purposes: investment in domestic production kh, R&D-
investment ￿ and the two international investment alternatives FPI kp and
FDI kd. Further, in the combined scenario the present value of the ￿rms capital
￿ ows is a function of the three state variables: home productivity ￿, productiv-
ity of the portfolio investments ￿ and the productivity of the direct investment
 . These three variables summarize all the necessary information for an optimal
investment-decision in the present period. We need the functional equation of
the optimizing problem (38) to derive the optimality conditions. Again, the
steps are very similar to the isolated investment strategies and therefore, we
neglect them and directly turn to the functional equation







t + ￿[V c (￿t￿t) ￿ V c (￿t)] + " + ￿ + ￿] (39)
where ￿ ￿ V c
￿  (￿￿￿)( ￿ )￿c and ￿c ￿ (dz￿)(dz ). In (39) we have the invest-
ment e⁄ects of the isolated international strategies combined. Additionally, the
common variation of the two international investments is included through ￿.
31We have to keep in mind that fd > fp still holds.
32We will keep the detailed transforming-steps very short as the necessary steps for the
transformation are similar to the steps undertaken in the previous isolated section.
18Optimality Conditions with Combined International Investment (CII)
R&D Investment Following (39), the optimality condition for R&D-
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. (40)
The ￿rst part of the bracket stays unchanged. Also, the isolated e⁄ects of
the di⁄erent investment possibilities, ￿ and {, are the same as above. But the
interaction of FPI and FDI changes the impact of the isolated investment e⁄ects.
The only new term is ￿￿. Its impact depends on the international investment
interaction, too. Table (3) summarizes the e⁄ects from the isolated strategies
and adds the common e⁄ects in case of CII.
impact FPI impact FDI impact FDI common
low control high control impact
eastern FPI / eastern FDI ￿ > 0 { > 0 { > 0 ￿￿ > 0
southern FPI / southern FDI ￿ < 0 { > 0 { < 0 ￿￿ > 0
eastern FPI / southern FDI ￿ > 0 { > 0 { < 0 ￿￿ < 0
southern FPI / eastern FDI ￿ < 0 { > 0 { > 0 ￿￿ < 0
Table 3: Impact of di⁄erent International Investment Possibilities
From Table (3), we can emphasize two cases. The ￿rst case is a domestic
￿rm with low in￿ uence on the foreign revenue (or low productivity). According
to Table (3), there is no directly dominant strategy with respect to FDI. FDI
in the East has the same impact on R&D-valuation than FDI in the South.
However, combining FDI and FPI a⁄ects on the R&D-valuation shows that the
combination with FPI in a southern country and FDI in the East has a slightly
higher positive impact on the R&D valuation. With FPI in an unrelated country,
the ￿rm secures risk diversi￿cation. Isolated FDI in the East is not better than
isolated FDI in the South but in combination with southern FPI both investment
possibilities are negatively correlated and this pushes the marginal valuation of
R&D-investment additionally.
The second case is a ￿rm with high in￿ uence on the foreign revenue (or
high productivity). The preferred FPI location stays unchanged; whereas FDI
switches to the South. Now, technology transfer is easily possible via FDI. As in
the former case, FPI still serves as diversi￿cation instrument for domestic risk.
It does not hedge FDI-location risk anymore. But with the increasing domestic
productivity and its higher impact on foreign revenue, the remaining share of
FDI location speci￿c risk diminishes.
33For simpli￿cation time indices are dropped.
19Home Production Analogue to the isolated investment possibilities,
the impact of home production does not change
V c










In combination with the marginal valuation of R&D-investment, the impact of
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. (42)
We see from Table (3), that the optimal investment combinations with respect
to R&D-investment are the optimal combinations with respect to the valuation
of home production in combination with R&D. But we still cannot generalize
this optimal investment combination.
CII First, we have to examine the e⁄ects on the various international
investments and the combination of all e⁄ects. As they are all derived similarly
to the isolated strategies, Table (4) just summarizes the results
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Table 4: Optimality Conditions with CII
From Table (4), we see that each marginal valuation increases with negative
correlation of the home industry and the chosen industry for FPI (￿ < 0). The
risk of unsuccessful R&D-investment at home can be propped up by the short
term portfolio-investment.
To detect the preferred FDI location, again we have to distinguish two cases:
low and high impact on the foreign ￿rm. With low productivity and low control,
{ > 0 reduces the respective valuation. The positive sign for { arises under east-
ern as well as southern FDI. Overall, there is no facilitated technology transfer
under eastern or southern FDI. However, FDI in the East is negatively corre-
lated with the chosen FPI location. This variation e⁄ect dampens the direct
negative FDI impact on the respective valuations. Hence, both international
investments are mostly favoured with FPI in South and FDI in the eastern
country. For FPI, the risk diversi￿cation is the stronger e⁄ect with the highest
impact on the ￿rm decision. In particular, FPI is the more ￿ exible investment
20and can be adjusted with only minor costs. Therefore, it is the appropriate
instrument to diversify a ￿rm￿ s risk. On the other hand, FDI reacts more sen-
sitive to productivity changes and thus, is the favourable instrument to exploit
productivity gains internationally. The additionally arising negative correlation
between the two international investments pushes all valuations slightly up.
With high domestic control over the foreign ￿rm the preferred FDI location
switches from the East to the South. High control (low a) reduces the share
of location or industry speci￿c risk and facilitates the technology transfer from
home to the South.34 FPI looses its function of direct-hedging FDI location
speci￿c risk. But, FPI still works as hedging instrument for R&D risk. With
the increasing domestic control - and therefore higher impact of ￿ on the FDI
revenue, this role even gains importance. Higher domestic productivity requires
higher R&D-investments and this in turn stipulates a more intensive risk hedg-
ing. Concluding, FPI loses its impact as direct hedging instrument with respect
to FDI but with respect to domestic production and thus indirectly to FDI, the
hedging necessity increases.
In CII, FPI can prop up the risk from home production and FDI. The rela-
tions between the home country and the recipient countries are unchanged to
the isolated investment scenarios for FPI as well as for FDI. Hence, we expect
in CII the share of FPI to adjust to short-term environment changes whereas
FDI stays unchanged. Because of the complexity of the problem there is not
possibility to derive an explicit analytical solution for the respective interna-
tional investment shares. The de￿nite shares of FPI and FDI will be derived
numerically.
4 Optimal Investment Strategies
As for both FDI investor scenarios - low and high control on the foreign ￿rm,
the results emphasize that FPI works as diversi￿cation instrument and the ￿rm
uses FDI as a technology transfer channel. These ￿ndings are valid for the
isolated strategies as well as for the combined strategy. To prove or reject these
￿ndings clearly in the following analysis we consider FDI in the East and FPI
in the South.
Unfortunately, the problem has no tractable closed form solution. Hence,
the solution must be approximated by numerical methods. We break the model
down into many one-period decisions. We use recursive policy function itera-
tion.35 From a given capital stock K = 10 for every period we set the choice
for investment in domestic production kh. The remaining decision variables are
a result of the optimality conditions. We repeated this procedure with various
values for kh. The initial value of ￿ is set to one and changes according to the
R&D-investment decision. Additionally, we examined di⁄erent cost structures.
They changed the results in terms of their value but they never had an impact
34A high home productivity ￿ has equivalent consequences.
35For detailed discussion and mathematical background see Adda and Cooper (2003), Judd
(1998) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
21on the bottom line of the results. We tested the model with di⁄erent time
horizons: 10; 20; 30; 40; 50 periods. There are some small variations in the ab-
solute investment values but the length of the time horizon does not change the
main results either. The results are only sensitive to productivity strength and
correlation of the international investments. This is discussed in the following
sections.
The ￿rst run computes the solution for the isolated international investment
strategies and determines the cut-o⁄s at which the ￿rm changes from one strat-
egy to another (home, FPI or FDI). In the second run, we repeat the same steps
for the combined international investment strategy. Precisely, with CII the ￿rm
changes its strategy only once: from isolated home production to FPI and FDI
at the same time.
We derive a benchmark case with a depreciation of ￿ = 0:3. A higher
depreciation pushes the start of international activity backwards in time and a
lower depreciation pulls it forward. The general results stay the same. Further,
the probability for successful R&D-investment ￿ varies and shows a signi￿cant
impact on the ￿rms￿decision to invest internationally or not.
4.1 Isolated International Investment
Start of International Activity The ￿rst international activity of the ￿rm
is FPI. As expected, FPI requires lower cut-o⁄productivity than FDI. However,
the ￿rm starts investing in FPI not until the probability of successful R&D is
0:3 or higher. The ￿gures (1) and (2) show for example the investment choices
and changes for a R&D-success probability of ￿ = 0:3 and ￿ = 0:5. Even with
￿ = 0:5, the international activity starts very late in time. With increasing
R&D-probability, the ￿rm undertakes international investment at an earlier
stage. This is very intuitive, as with high success-probability the productivity
increases more quickly. All these results con￿rm the ￿ndings in the recent
literature. Firms with low productivity stay isolated at the home market. With
a slight increase in productivity the ￿rst small international steps are made and













































































































































































Figure 1: Isolated investmentshares of all four possible investments depend on
time and domestic produdicitvity. R&D success probability ￿ = 0:3.
Furthermore, the ￿gures (1) and (2) show that not only with a high pro-
ductivity FDI is undertaken, there is also a reversed relationship. As soon as
the ￿rm invests in FDI the R&D investment increases and this in turn boosts
the productivity ￿. Thus with the additional investment abroad, investment in
R&D is more valuable than without the direct investment. The incentive to
invest in R&D increases because a higher domestic productivity now pushes not
only the domestic output and return but also the return of the foreign direct in-
vestment. Anyway, this e⁄ect diminishes with time. Each additional investment
in R&D adds less productivity for each unit capital invested in home and foreign
production. Consequently, the ￿rm will draw capital from R&D investment and
invest it in additional FDI and later on even in additional home production.
Again, the ￿gures (1) and (2) show the increasing share of FDI and the late













































































































































































Figure 2: Isolated investmentshares of all four possible investments depend on
time and domestic productivity. R&D success probability ￿ = 0:5.
Variation of Foreign Productivity Firstly, we examine changes in the FPI
productivity. Table (5) shows that neither the productivity cut o⁄s nor the cut-
o⁄ time change with variations in FPI productivity. One might have expected
that with higher foreign productivity the ￿rm engages earlier in international
investment. This is not the case. The ￿rm ￿rst secures the home production
process and then goes abroad.
24Switch-Period Productivity Share of Switch-Period Productivity Share of
FPI of FPI FPI FDI of FDI FDI
￿ = 0;3 5 1,087 0,352 6 1,36 6,0
low fpi x x x x x x
high fpi 5 1,087 0,84 6 1,36 6,0
￿ = 0;4 4 1,086 0,36 5 1,38 6,0
low fpi x x x x x x
high fpi 4 1,086 0,85 5 1,38 6,0
￿ = 0;5 3 1,07 0,41 4 1,35 6,0
low fpi x x x x x x
high fpi 3 1,07 0,92 4 1,35 6,0
￿ = 0;6 3 1,09 0,37 4 1,59 5,0
low fpi x x x x x x
high fpi 3 1,09 0,86 4 1,59 5,0
￿ = 0;7 2 1,05 0,5 3 1,21 7,0
low fpi x x x x x x
high fpi 2 1,05 1,04 3 1,21 7,0
￿ = 0;8 2 1,06 0,48 3 1,36 6,0
low fpi x x x x x x
high fpi 2 1,06 1,01 3 1,36 6,0
Table 5: Productivity cut-o⁄s and changing investments with varying FPI pro-
ductivity. Switch-Period is the period in which the ￿rm engages in FPI or FDI
for the ￿rst time.
Further, the ￿rm does not reduce or increase its share in FDI. Only the
FPI shares increase with higher FPI productivity. This might seem intuitive,
as only the FPI-productivity changes. Hence, the FDI shares are independent
of the FPI productivity. Let￿ s take a closer look on FDI-productivity changes,
to see whether this independence also hold in the opposite direction and we can
con￿rm FPI as the more ￿ exible instrument.
Table (6) compares the ￿rms￿international investment with high and low
FDI productivity. It shows that the ￿rm engages in international investment
earlier in time with a high FDI-productivity than with a lower FDI-productivity.
Further, the productivity cut-o⁄is lower than with the benchmark productivity.
The only exceptions are the cases with a very high success probability of R&D
investment. For these cases the cut-o⁄s are the same as for the benchmark case
and the high FDI-productivity.
25Switch-Period Productivity Share Switch-Period Productivity Share
FPI of FPI of FPI FDI of FDI of FDI
￿ = 0;2 x x x x x x
low fdi x x x x x x
high fdi 2 1,01 0,6 3 1,28 8,0
￿ = 0;3 5 1,087 0,352 6 1,36 6,0
low fdi x x x x x x
high fdi 2 1,02 0,58 3 1,04 8,0
￿ = 0;4 4 1,086 0,36 5 1,38 6,0
low fpi x x x x x x
high fpi 2 1,03 0,56 3 1,06 8,0
￿ = 0;5 3 1,07 0,41 4 1,35 6,0
low fpi x x x x x x
high fpi 2 1,04 0,54 3 1,07 8,0
￿ = 0;6 3 1,09 0,37 4 1,59 5,0
low fpi x x x x x x
high fpi 2 1,04 0,52 3 1,09 8,0
￿ = 0;7 2 1,05 0,5 3 1,21 7,0
low fpi x x x x x x
high fpi 2 1,05 0,5 3 1,21 7,0
￿ = 0;8 2 1,06 0,48 3 1,36 6,0
low fpi x x x x x x
high fpi 2 1,06 0,6 3 1,36 6,0
Table 6: Productivity cut-o⁄s and changing investment shares with varying FDI
productivity. Switch-Period is the period in which the ￿rm engages in FPI or
FDI for the ￿rst time.
Finally, with varying FDI-productivity both international shares change in
comparison to the benchmark case. In particular, the FPI shares do not only
vary in comparison to the benchmark case. They also change between the vari-
ous cases of high FDI-productivity while the FDI shares stay almost the same.
Again, only with the high R&D-probability the FDI shares change between the
di⁄erent cases, but they do not change with respect to the benchmark case. So,
we ￿nd again FPI as the ￿ exible instrument adjusting to short-term changes
while FDI reacts more sluggishly. Note that, these are only results for the
isolated investment scenario.
4.2 Combined International Investment
In contrast to the isolated international investment strategy, the ￿rm starts its
international activities with both investment alternatives FPI and FDI at the
same time. Figure (3) shows that even with a low R&D-probability, the ￿rm
engages in its ￿rst international investment. However, we have to distinguish
between the ￿rst international investment and the investment in FDI. In both
cases, the ￿rst international activity under CII (CII FDI and FPI vs isolated
26FPI) takes place at an earlier date in time than the ￿rst international ￿rm
activity under an isolated international investment strategy. Additionally, the
￿rst international activity at all requires a lower R&D success probability under
CII than for the isolated international investments.
At a moderate probability, the ￿rm switches from home to international
investment (isol. FPI and combined FPI-FDI respectively at the same time).
With increasing probability the isolated investment even dominates the com-
bined strategy in time. It is important to keep in mind, that in the current
situation a ￿rm starting isolated FPI is compared with a ￿rm starting com-







































Figure 3: The ￿rst international acitivities of both investment scenarios are
compared. For the isolated investment strategy the ￿rst international activity
is FPI. For the combined investment strategy the ￿rst international acitivity is
FDI. Both international investements are compared in dependence of the R&D
success probability.
Now, we turn to the comparison of isolated FDI and the combined inter-
national investment. For the switch to FDI the picture changes as shown in
Figure (4). Under CII the ￿rm switches from home production to international
investment at a lower R&D-probability and at an earlier stage in time. Further,








































Figure 4: The ￿rst investment in FDI for the isolated and the combined interna-
tional investment are compared. Both investments are depicted in dependence
of the R&D success probability.
However, CII does not always dominate isolated FDI in productivity. Par-
ticularly, the productivity cut-o⁄s for FDI under CII do not always lie below
the cut-o⁄s for isolated FDI. The productivity cut-o⁄s are analysed according to
the value of ￿ at which the ￿rm switches from one strategy (for example home)
to another strategy (for example FDI). We compare the marginal impact of ￿
on the di⁄erent discounted capital ￿ ows under a given productivity level. The
￿gures (5) and (6) show the di⁄erent productivities for FDI cut o⁄with isolated





















































Figure 5: Producitivity of the ￿rst FDI for the isolated and the combined in-
ternational investment strategy are compared. The R&D success probability
varies and a positive correlation between FDI and FPI is assumed.
The domination of the isolated investment strategy might be unexpected.
In the case of the positively correlated foreign productivities, FPI cannot prop
up the FDI variations directly. But FPI absorbs the variations of the domestic
productivity. The ￿rm only invests in southern FDI if it has a high impact on the
foreign productivity, hence ￿ in￿ uences signi￿cantly the foreign direct return.
This in turn transfers the domestic variations into the foreign productivity.
These variations constitute a high share of the foreign variation as the impact of
￿ is high. Since FPI is an e⁄ective instrument to dampen the domestic variation
resulting from ￿, FPI indirectly smoothes variations in the foreign direct return.
The incentive to invest in domestic R&D is enhanced by this mechanism and the


































































Figure 6: Producitivities of the ￿rst FDI for the isolated and the combined
international investment are compared. The R&D success probability varies
and a negative correlation between FDI and FPI is assumed.
In case of the negative correlation the productivity cut-o⁄s of both invest-
ment strategies are as expected. The isolated cut-o⁄ productivity is always
higher than the cut-o⁄ for the combined international investments. Obviously,
FPI props up the FDI variations as well as the variations resulting from domestic
productivity uncertainty.
One may not neglect, that with positive as well as with negative correlated
international investments the combined international investment starts not only
earlier in time than the isolated international investment but also at a lower
R&D success-probability. Thus, the possibility to use FPI as a ￿nancial hedging
instrument boosts the value of corporate diversi￿cation via FDI. This con￿rms
the results in Table (4).
Variation of Foreign Productivity First of all, minor changes in the for-
eign productivities relation may diminish any international investment under
isolated strategy completely. If both productivities are very low or at least
the FPI-productivity is very low then the ￿rm does not invest abroad. On the
other hand, these changes do not reduce international investment under CII to-
tally. The productivity cut-o⁄changes as both foreign productivities drift apart
(negatively correlated) or move together (positively correlated). The following
































Figure 7: Investment shares of FPI in the combined international investment scenario





























Figure 8: Investment shares of FDI in the combined international investment scenario
are depicted for a negative as well as positive correlation between FPI and FDI.
31Overall, the share of FPI varies more thorough the changed productivities
than the FDI shares. The latter are more stable than the former. Addition-
ally, FPI shares under CII ￿ uctuate even more than under isolated international
investment. Hence with CII, the ￿rm reacts to short-term changes in its environ-
ment by adjusting FPI and keeping FDI stable. Thus, FPI does not necessarily
increase with FDI, but adjusts according to R&D-probability, depreciation and
variation in home and both foreign productivities. These results con￿rm again
the risk-adjusting task of FPI and the more sluggish technology transfer FDI
instrument.
5 Conclusion
This paper shows that even though the empirical distinction between FDI and
FPI is rather complicated a di⁄erentiation of a ￿rms￿motivation to use these in-
vestment instruments is possible.36 We examine in a dynamic investment setting
that the relation of FPI and FDI is rather strategic complementary. Isolated
FPI and FDI investments are compared to combined FPI and FDI investments.
The combined investment strategy dominates the isolated investments always
in time. Further, CII comprises a higher incentive to invest in R&D. The risk
diversifying e⁄ect from additional FPI pushes the marginal valuation of R&D
investment above the valuation with isolated investment strategies. As a con-
sequence, home productivity increases much faster and without smaller relative
opportunity costs than under isolated investment strategies. Finally, this leads
to a higher productivity cut o⁄for FDI but at an earlier date in time. The signif-
icant higher CII R&D investment than isolated FDI R&D investment con￿rms
this observations. Surprisingly, this is not only the case with a combination of
horizontal FDI in a country with similar structure and FPI in a country with
dissimilar structure than the home country, but also with both international
investments in a dissimilar country structure than the home structure.
Furthermore, we also ￿nd that ￿rms adjust to short-term changes via FPI
and keep FDI stable. FPI can prop up small and medium sized changes and
therefore, the valuation of FDI with combined FPI is higher than of isolated
FDI. Hence, a combined FPI and FDI investment strategy increases the ￿rms￿
￿ exibility. A combination of both investment instruments increases the valua-
tion of the respective instruments.
36Empirical data for ￿rms￿FPI is very hard to obtain. Aggregate portfolio investment data
is available on ￿rm level. The sector or industry of the portfolio investment is not possible to
locate because there is no noti￿cation requirement for ￿rms.
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347 Appendix
Derivation of Expected Capital Flow
The value of the ￿rm in the case without international investment is a func-
tion of the state variable ￿ (productivity).
dV h = V h
￿ d￿ (43)
The state variable follows a Poisson process with q = 1 with prob. ￿dt and

























change of capital ￿ow caused by increased ￿ weighted with the probability
(45)
+ (1 ￿ ￿dt)
￿
V h (￿) ￿ V h (￿)
￿
| {z }


















For a general discussion of Poisson processes in continuous time see Dixit and
Pindyck (1994).
Derivation of the Pro￿t Function with Variable Revenue
Domestic consumers have Dixit-Stiglitz preferences for di⁄erentiated goods
with elasticity of substitution # = 1























for each good variety produced by ￿rm i. In the following the ￿rm index i is
neglected, as we just analyse one representative ￿rm.
35According to (5) the pro￿t of the ￿rm in period t equals







Revenue equals supply multiplied by the price we can rearrange (52) to



















￿t (￿t) = rh







t ￿ ￿t. (54)
36